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Abstract
We examine the impact of an optimal emissions tax on research and development of emission reducing green technology (E-R&D) in the presence of R&D
spillovers. We show that the size and effectiveness of the optimal emissions tax
depends on the type of the R&D spillover: input or output spillover. In the case
of R&D input spillovers (where only knowledge spillovers are accounted for), the
optimal emissions tax required to stimulate R&D is always higher than when there
is an R&D output spillover (where abatement and knowledge spillovers exist si∗
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multaneously). We also find that optimal emissions taxation and cooperative R&D
complement each other when R&D spillovers are small, leading to lower emissions.

Key Words: Environmental R&D, Green Technology, R&D Spillover, Emissions
Tax.
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1

Introduction

Public policies targeting R&D on emissions reducing technology offer the greatest scope
for achieving prolonged and sustained reduction in emissions (Kneese and Schultze, 1975;
Jung et al., 1996; Jaffe et al., 2003; OECD, 2010). Without the presence of some form
of policy to internalize the cost of pollution, the relevant incentives are not sufficient
to promote investment in green technology (environmental R&D). Benefits generated by
R&D do not always accrue to the investing firm (Griliches, 1984, 1992; Jaffe, 1986, 1998).
This is accentuated with emissions reducing technologies, as they provide two types of
spillovers: the first is associated with the public good aspect of knowledge generated from
research (standard R&D spillovers), while the second is a consequence of implementing
an emissions reducing technology targeted at rectifying a public bad.
In this paper we examine the effectiveness of an emission tax policy in the presence
of these two types of R&D spillover: we explore the interplay between process-focused
environmental R&D (E-R&D), abatement effort and spillovers in a non-tournament R&D
model. In particular, we provide a comparison of two different approaches to modelling
research and development of emissions reducing (green) technology. The first approach
is based on d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) (AJ henceforth), where spillovers occur
in abatement and firms are able to free-ride off the abatement efforts of competitors.
Here the spillover operates on the output side of the E-R&D process (E-R&D output
spillover).1 The second modelling approach is based on Kamien et al. (1992) (KMZ
henceforth), where the spillover operates on the input side of the the R&D process (E1

This approach is widely used in the literature on environmental R&D (e.g., Scott (1996), Chiou and
Hu (2001), Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002) and Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010)).
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R&D input spillover). Here spillovers occur as a consequence of firms applying technology
developed by other firms. This second approach, to the best of our knowledge, has
not appeared in the environmental R&D literature. Hence this paper provides the first
comparison of the impact of these two types of R&D spillover on abatement and emissions
in the specific context of an optimal (second-best) emission tax.2
We find that there are substantial differences between the KMZ and AJ models. When
firms do not cooperate in R&D, the AJ model predicts that when R&D spillovers are
small, there is a negative relationship between the emission tax and spillovers. This
implies that R&D spillovers and emission taxes offset each other, and that as R&D
spillovers become large, there is an incentive for firms to engage in cooperative R&D
either by sharing information or sharing costs. This trade-off does not exist in the
KMZ model under non-cooperative R&D regimes and emissions taxes rise as the R&D
spillover increases. The R&D input spillover always creates a disincentive when firms
invest independently. By contrast, when firms cooperate in E-R&D, there is always a
trade-off between the emissions tax and R&D spillovers for both models. In the AJ
model, firms free-ride off the abatement effort of others, whereas in the KMZ model
this is not possible. As a consequence, in the KMZ model there always exist decreasing
returns to scale in abatement investment.
A simple difference in the modelling of the E-R&D process, in particular, the way
2

In the context of (non-environmental) cost-reducing R&D, Amir (2000) shows that these two approaches are equivalent only if R&D spillovers are negligible. When non-negligible spillovers exist, the
AJ model exaggerates the impact of cost-reducing R&D, hence Amir (2000) argues that the KMZ model
is more appropriate. Hauenschild (2003), Hinloopen & Vendekerchhove (2009), Stepanova and Tesoriere
(2011) and Burr et al. (2013) further explore the differences between input and output technological
spillovers within the non-tournament R&D literature.
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spillovers operate, leads to significant differences in policy implications and implementation. In terms of the relative effectiveness of R&D organization in combination with
an emissions tax, both models show a similar outcome: R&D cooperation is more effective in reducing emissions when R&D spillovers are small (less than 0.5). When R&D
spillovers are relatively large (greater than 0.5), R&D competition is more effective in
reducing emissions. This indicates that there is a trade-off between the relative effectiveness of emissions taxes and cooperative R&D. Moreover, the scale of abatement and
emissions reduction is quite different between the KMZ and AJ models, with the AJ
model generating higher abatement, lower levels of emissions and taxes than the KMZ
model under non-cooperative and cooperative R&D regimes.
The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 presents the model, explaining the differences
between the AJ and KMZ approaches. Sections 3 and 4 contain the analysis using the two
different approaches. Section 5 presents results on the optimal(second-best) emissions
tax for the case where the government pre-commits as well as abatement and emissions.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs of propositions are in the appendix.

2

The Model

We formulate a generalization of the analysis presented in Chiou and Hu (2001). Consider
a Cournot duopoly producing a homogeneous good.3 The inverse demand function for
3

We restrict attention to a duopoly in the interest of a simplified presentation. The analysis presented
here carries over to a model with n identical firms.

3
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this good is given by
P (q1 , q2 ) := a − Q,

Q = q1 + q 2 ,

where a is the demand intercept and Q is the aggregate amount supplied by both firms.
As is standard practice in the R&D spillovers literature, there are no fixed costs of
production and the marginal cost of production is normalized to zero without loss of
generality. When each firm produces qi , it also emits pollution at the rate of ē per unit
of production. The cost of pollution is imposed on the firm by a linear emissions tax t.
To guarantee non-negative production, a > tē.
The profit function for firm i is given by

πi = (a − (qi + qj ) − t (ē − s (ri , rj ; β))) qi − c(ri ),

i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,

(1)

where s (ri , rj ; β) is firm i’s effective abatement expressed as a function of its own ER&D effort ri , firm j’s effort rj , and c(ri ) denotes firm i’s R&D costs of investing in
abatement reducing technology. The parameter β denotes the degree with which each
firm can benefit from its rival’s research (spillover).
The effective abatement function s (ri , rj ; β) models the way in which a firm’s E-R&D
can reduce its marginal emission rate ē and in turn, its marginal emissions tax payments.
The effective abatement function s (ri , rj ; β) is assumed to be continuously twice differentiable, strictly increasing and concave with s(0, 0; β) = 0 and s(ri , rj ; β) ≤ ē. In addition,
c(·) is continuously twice differentiable for ri ≥ 0, c(0) = 0, c0 (ri ) > 0 and c00 (ri ) ≥ 0 for
ri > 0, i = 1, 2. In the sequel we use the following specification, c(ri ) =

γri2
,
2

where γ

4
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measures the relative efficiency of R&D investment (higher values of γ lead to steeper
marginal costs of R&D, or, in other words E-R&D becomes more difficult).
The government (or regulator) pre-commits to an emissions tax by maximising society’s
net social surplus.4 The simple game we present is an non-tournament R&D model
consisting of the following three-stages:
1. Stage 1: The regulator decides on the emissions tax t, to maximize welfare

W = CS + P S + T − D,

where CS denotes consumer surplus, P S denotes producer surplus, T denotes
aggregate revenues from emissions taxes and D denotes the social cost of environmental damages caused by polluting firms.
2. Stage 2: Given the optimal tax t, firms choose their E-R&D with the intention to
reduce pollution. This choice is based on whether firms cooperate and share costs
of R&D or not. This stage is designed according to either the AJ or the KMZ
approach to modelling spillovers.
3. Stage 3: Firms engage in Cournot competition. Their production decisions, in
turn, determine total emissions.
4

Alternatively, the government could make an interim decision regarding the emissions tax after
firms have made their E-R&D decisions. This case corresponds to a situation where the government
pursues a time-consistent policy. This is not considered in this paper, having been examined in PoyagoTheotoky (2007, 2010), albeit for a slightly different emissions structure. Petrakis and Xepapadeas
(2001, 2003) provide a comparison of these two types of emissions tax structure under monopoly and
Cournot oligopoly but in the absence of R&D spillovers, showing that time consistent policies generate
less emissions.

5
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For both the AJ and KMZ specifications, we explore the following four scenarios:5
1. Case N (non-cooperative R&D): Firms behave non-cooperatively in setting
R&D, choosing neither to coordinate on R&D nor share information.
2. Case NJ (non-cartelized research joint venture): Firms behave as in Case
N, choosing R&D separately. However, they share information so that the R&D
spillover parameter β is set equal to one.
3. Case C (cartelized R&D): Firms coordinate their R&D by choosing ri to maximize the sum of their profits π1 + π2 .
4. Case CJ (cartelized research joint venture): Firms behave similar to Case C,
choosing ri to maximize their joint profits. In addition they also share information,
so that the R&D spillover parameter β is set equal to one.

3

Cournot Market Stage Game

In the following, we use β̃ and β̄ to denote spillovers in the AJ and KMZ models respectively. We use this notation because these spillovers are not equivalent in the two models
and act in very different ways. In the AJ model, the spillover β̃ acts on abatement
and for this reason incorporates free-riding on both abatement effort and firm specific
E-R&D; while in the KMZ model, the spillover parameter β̄ acts only on E-R&D expenditure.
5

Note that because, in the final stage of the game, Cournot competition ensues, we use the behaviour
of firms in the E-R&D stage game to describe each of these scenarios.

6
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3.1

The AJ Model

Spillovers are regarded as leakages in technological know-how and take place in final
outcomes (emission reduction). Each firm’s final emission reduction is the sum of its
autonomously acquired part and a fraction (equal to the spillover parameter β̃) of the
other firms’ part. Hence effective abatement effort is given by




s ri , rj ; β̃ = ri + β̃rj ,

i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.

(2)

Hence, each firm can reduce its marginal emission rate ē, and in turn its tax burden, by
undertaking ri of emissions reducing abatement.
Equilibrium profits can now be written as:

πi (ri , rj ) =





2 γ
1
a − t ē − ri 2 − β̃ + rj 1 − 2β̃
− ri2 ,
9
2

i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.

(3)

The following proposition can now be stated. Proposition 1 shows that firm i’s abatement
has two effects; a direct effect and a strategic effect. With the direct effect, an increase in
firm i’s E-R&D, always leads to higher output, regardless of the extent of spillover. This
is due to the simple fact that increased effort in emissions reducing technology lowers the
tax burden for firm i, making it cheaper for it to produce. The strategic effect ensures
that firm i’s E-R&D spills over to the opponent, making the opponent’s emission tax
bill decrease. The strategic effect, if β̃ < 0.5 and firm i’s E-R&D increases, will cause
firm j to decrease its output. If β̃ ≥ 0.5 the opposite occurs, so that an increase in firm
i’s E-R&D effort leads to an increase firm j’s output. Hence, the size of the spillover is
7
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important in determining the direction of change in the strategic effect that E-R&D has
on output.
Proposition 1 For a given level of emission tax t:
1. An increase in firm i’s E-R&D, ri , leads to an increase in output, qi , for all values
of the spillover β̃ (direct effect).
2. For β̃ > 0.5, an increase in firm i’s E-R&D output, ri , has a positive effect on the
rival firm j 0 s output, qj , and negative otherwise (strategic effect).
3. An increase in the spillover β̃ results in an increase in the output of firm i so long
as firm j’s E-R&D satisfies rj >

3.2

ri
2

(otherwise output decreases).

The KMZ Model

In this variant, a firm can reduce its marginal rate of emissions ē, by spending an amount
yi in abatement technology. The cost of generating this technology is given by c(yi ) = yi .
The abatement effort of firm i is then given by
q
s yi , yj ; β̄ = 2(yi + β̄yj )/γ.


(4)

There is a spillover effect from applying this technology, which is given by β̄yj , 0 ≤ β̄ ≤ 1.
The spillover β̄ captures the degree to which it is possible for firm i to free ride off the
technological investments (E-R&D inputs) of the other firm. This is a distinctly different
interpretation to that of the AJ approach. Here each firm’s final (or effective) R&D
investment in emission reduction is the sum of its own (autonomous) expenditure and a
8
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fixed fraction (given by the spillover parameter) of the other firm’s expenditure. Hence,
all spillovers are purely technological. As first noted in Amir (2000), when β̃ = β̄ = 0,
the following monotone transformation holds
r
ri =

γ
2
yi ⇐⇒ yi = ri2 ,
γ
2

i = 1, 2,

implying that the AJ and KMZ models are equivalent.
The equilibrium profit for firm i, is given by:
1
πi =
9

r
r




 2
2
2
β̄yi + yj − 2
yi + β̄yj
− yi ,
a − t ē +
γ
γ

i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (5)

In the presence of spillovers, it is obvious from equations (3) and (5), that the above
transformation cannot work. Hence, the two specifications are not generally equivalent.
Proposition 2 is similar to Proposition 1 above.
Proposition 2 For a given level of emission tax t:
p
1. When β̄ < (>) 1/2 (yi + β̄yj )/(yj + β̄yi ), if firm j increases (decreases) its R&D
expenditure, yj , then firm i’s output qi , increases (decreases).
2. For all values of β̄, an increase in yi leads to an increase in qi .
3. An increase in the spillover β̄ results in an increase (decrease) in qi whenever the

9
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following condition holds
yi
1
< (>)
yj
2

s

yi + β̄yj
,
yj + β̄yi

0 < β̄ ≤ 1.

Proposition 2 indicates that in the KMZ model, the same qualitative relationships holds
as in the AJ model, in that E-R&D expenditure has both a direct and a strategic effect
on a firm’s production, with the sign of the strategic effect depending on the extent of
spillovers. The major difference is that the direction of the strategic effect depends on
the relative size of each firm’s E-R&D expenditure. An interesting consequence is that
∂qi /∂ β̄ > 0 will hold only if ∂qi /∂yj > 0. This is a stronger result than that implied
by the AJ model. It indicates that the presence of an input spillover from firm j’s
E-R&D expenditure is crucial in determining whether or not firm i is able to expand
production.

4
4.1

E-R&D Green Technology Stage Game

The AJ Model

Cases N and NJ: Using equation (3) and solving the first order conditions yields the
equilibrium solutions reported in Table I.6
The following proposition shows that firm E-R&D decreases monotonically as the spillover increases.
6

The second order necessary condition and stability condition are given by 9γ − 2(2 − β)2 t2 > 0 and
2(2 − β)(2β − 1)t2 < 9γ − 2(2 − β)2 t2 . Both conditions are satisfied for γ > 4/3.

10
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Cases

E-R&D
(2−β̃)(a−ēt)t
9γ−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t2

N

rN =

NJ

rN J =

C

rC =

CJ

rCJ =

t(a−tē)
9γ−4t2

2t(1+β̃)(a−tē)
9γ−2(1+β̃)2 t2
4t(a−tē)
9γ−8t2

Output
3γ(a−ēt)
9γ−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t2

qN =

qN J =
qC =

Emissions

3γ(a−tē)
9γ−4t2

3γ(a−tē)
9γ−2(1+β̃)2 t2

q CJ =

3γ(a−tē)
9γ−8t2

6γ(a−tē)[9γē−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)at]

EN =

2

(9γ−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t2 )

ENJ =
EC =

6γ(a−tē)[9γē−4at]
9γ−4t2

6γ(a−tē)[9γē−2t(1+β̃)(a+β̃tē)]
9γ−2(1+β̃)2 t2

E CJ =

6γ(a−tē)[9γē−4t(a+tē)]
9γ−8t2

Table I: E-R&D Stage solutions - AJ Model
Proposition 3 For a given emission tax t, increasing the spillover β̃ reduces firm ER&D effort, implying rN J ≤ rN for all 0 ≤ β̃ ≤ 1.
The impact of a change in β̃ on firm output is shown by:

6γt2 (a − tē)(1 − β̃)
∂q N
=
T 0,
∂ β̃
(9γ − 2(2 − β̃)(1 + β̃)t2 )2

β̃ S 1/2.

This implies that there are two forces at play: The first is the direct effect making E-R&D
more productive. However when β̃ > 0.5, the strategic effect of free-riding dominates.
Furthermore (from Table I) note that q N J ≤ q N for 0 < β̃ ≤ 1 so that emissions must
also be smaller within case NJ.
Regarding the impact of a change in β̃ on emissions, the trade-off is more complicated
and reveals a non-monotonic relationship between t and β̃ . There are two regions
identified for which a non-cartelized RJV (NJ) delivers a higher reduction in emissions
than non-cooperative R&D (N):

11
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• Region 1:
0 < β̃ < 1 and 0 ≤ ē ≤

a(9γ + 4t2 )
;
18γt

• Region 2:
s
|β̃| < 1/2 ± 3/2 1 +

18γ 2 (a − 2ēt)
a(9γ + 4t2 )
2a(9γ 2 + 2t2 )
and
<
ē
<
.
t3 (9ēγ − 4at)
18γt
γt(36γ − 17t2 )

For all other regions (not listed), non-cooperative R&D delivers lower emissions.

Cases C and CJ: Under cooperative R&D both firms choose their abatement ri to
maximize joint profits

V =

2
X

πi (q1 (r1 , r2 ), q2 (r1 , r2 ), ri ; β) .

i=1

In the case of a cartelized RJV β̃ = 1 (CJ) and in the case of a research cartel 0 < β̃ < 1
(C). Solving this maximization problem, we obtain the equilibrium values reported in
Table I.7
We now state the following proposition, showing the effect the cartel has on internalising
the E-R&D externality:
Proposition 4 For a given the emission tax t, increasing the spillover β̃ increases R&D
effort, implying that rCJ ≥ rC for all 0 < β̃ < 1 (C).
7

The necessary second order condition under a research cartel is 9γ > 2(5 − β(8 − 5β))t2 , implying
that γ > 4/9 is sufficient for all values of β.

12
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The impact of a change in β̃ on firm output can be seen by differentiating equilibrium
output with respect to β̃ for a given emissions tax t. This is given as follows:
12(1 + β̃)γt2 (a − ēt))
> 0,
(9γ − 2(1 + β̃)2 t2 )2

0 < β̃ ≤ 1.

Hence, the equilibrium output is strictly increasing in β̃, which implies, q C ≤ q CJ for
0 < β̃ ≤ 1.

4.2

KMZ Model
Cases
N

E-R&D

Output

2t2 (a−tē)2 (2−β̄)2 γ

yN =

(1+β̄)(

NJ

yN J =

C

yC =

CJ

y CJ =

9γ−2(2−β̄)t2

2

)

2t2 (a−tē)2 γ
2(9γ−2t2 )2

2t2 (1+β̄)(a−tē)2 γ
(9γ−2(1+β̄)t2 )2
4t2 (a−tē)2 γ
(9γ−4t2 )2

(a−ēt)(9γ−4(2−β̄)t2 )

qN =

3(9γ−2(2−β̄ )t2 )

qN J =
qC =

Emissions

(a−ēt)(
3(9γ−2t2 )

9γ−4t2

)

(a−tē)(9γ−4(1+β̄)t2 )

q CJ =

3(9γ−2(1+β̄)t2 )
(a−tē)(9γ−8t2 )
3(9γ−4t2 )

2(a−ēt)(9γ−4(2−β̄)t2 )(9γē+2t(2−β̄)(a−2ēt)

EN =

3(9γ−2(2−β̄ )t2 )

ENJ =
EC =

2(a−ēt)(9γ−4t2 )(9γē+2t(a−2ēt))
3(9γ−2t2 )

2(a−ēt)(9γ−4t2 (1+β̄))(9ēγ+2t(a−2ēt)(1+β̄))
3(9γ−2t2 (1+β̄)

E CJ =

2(a−ēt)(9γ−8t2 )(9ēγ+4t(a−2ēt))
3(9γ−4t2 )

Table II: E-R&D Stage solutions - KMZ Model

Cases N and NJ: Using equation (5) and solving the first order conditions yields the
equilibrium solutions reported in Table II.8
The following proposition shows that, E-R&D expenditure decreases as spillovers increase. This again points to the pivotal role that RJVs have. In addition, it points out
to the strategic effect of β̄ on E-R&D expenditure dominating firms decisions.
8

The second order necessary condition is 9γ > (2 − β)2 t2 .
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Proposition 5 For a given emission tax t, increasing the spillover β̄ has the effect of
decreasing E-R&D expenditure. This implies that y N J ≤ y N for 0 ≤ β̄ ≤ 1.

Cases C and CJ: Under the research cartel, both firms choose their E-R&D expenditure yi in order to maximize joint profit. In the case of a cartelized RJV β̄ = 1 (CJ)
and in the case of a cartel 0 < β̄ < 1 (C). Solving this maximization problem we obtain
the equilibrium values reported in Table II.9
Although not provided here there is a similar result to Proposition 4, for the case of
cartelized research establishing that E-R&D expenditure is an increasing function of the
spillover so that y C > y CJ for 0 < β̄ < 1. As a consequence abatement will be higher
and emissions taxes will be lower under C than under CJ.

5

The Effects of an Optimal Emissions Tax

In this section, we explore the optimal (second-best) emission tax. As stated earlier, the
government makes an ex ante commitment at the beginning of the E-R&D stage to a
particular emissions tax. The government selects this tax by maximizing total welfare
(SW ).10 The social welfare function is given by:

SW (t; β, γ) = CS(t; β, γ) + P S(t; β, γ) + T (t; β, γ) − D(t; β, γ),
9

The second order necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium under research cartelization
is 9γ > 2(5 − β(8 − 5β))t2 .
10
The optimal emission tax is optimal in a second best sense, which is consistent with the welfare
analysis of R&D in Suzumura (1992).

14
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where, consumer surplus is CS = 12 Q2 , producer surplus P S = π1 + π2 and T is the aggregate emissions tax revenue. Environmental damage D is a function of total emissions,
D(E), with D(0) = 0, D0 > 0, D00 > 0 for E > 0. We use the following specific function
to model damage11
1
D(t; β, γ) = E 2 ,
2
where E = e1 + e2 . Taxes are linear in emissions, T = tE, where t ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate.
A uniform tax is used as we focus only on the symmetric equilibrium. Table III sets
out the main components of the social welfare for both the AJ and the KMZ models. It
includes only aggregate emissions E, as damages D and the total tax bill T are functions
of E and can be computed with little effort.
Cases

Consumer Surplus (CS)

Producer Surplus (P S)

Emissions (E)

18γ 2 (a−ēt)2

γ (a−ēt)2 (9γ−2(2−β̃)2 t2 )

6γ (9γē−2a(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t)(a−ēt)

AJ Model
N
NJ

2

(9γ−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t2 )

(9γ−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t2 )
γ (a−ēt)2 (9γ−2t2 )

18γ 2 (a−ēt)2
(9γ−4t2 )2

2

2

(9γ−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t2 )
6γ(9γē−4at)(a−ēt)
(9γ−4t2 )2

(9γ−4t2 )2
2γ(a−tē)2
9γ−2(1+β̃)2 t2

6γ (9γē−2at(1+β̃)2 )(a−tē)

(9γ−2(1+β̃)2 t2 )
18γ 2 (a−tē)2
(9γ−8t2 )4

2γ(a−tē)2
9γ−8t2

6γ(9γē−8at)(a−tē)
(9γ−8t2 )

2(a−ēt)2 ((1+β̄ )(9γ−4(2−β̄)t2 )+18γ(2−β̄)2 t2 )
9(1+β̄)(9γ−2(2−β̄)t2 )

2(a−ēt)(9γ−4t2 (2−β̄))(9γē−2t(2−β̄)(a−ēt))
243γ 2 +12(2−β̄)2 t4

9(9γ−2t2 )2

2(a−ēt)2 ((2(9γ−4t2 )+18γt2 )
18(9γ−2t2 )

2(a−ēt)(9γ−4t2 )(9γē−2t(a−ēt))
243γ 2 +12t4

C

2(a−tē)2 (9γ−4(1+β̄)t2 )
(9γ−2(1+β̄)t2 )2

2(a−ēt)2 (9γ−8t2 (1+β̄))
9(9γ−2t2 (1+β̄)

2(a−tē)2 (9γ−4(1+β̄)t2 )(9γē+2t(1+β̄)(a−2ēt))
3(9γ−2(1+β̄)t2 )2

CJ

2(a−tē)2 (9γ−8t2
(9γ−4t2 )2

2(a−ēt)2 (9γ−16t2 )
9(9γ−4t2

2(a−tē)2 (9γ−8t2 )(9γē+4t(a−2ēt))
3(9γ−4t2 )2

C
CJ

18γ 2 (a−tē)2
4

(9γ−2(1+β̃)2 t2 )

KMZ Model
2

N
NJ

2(a−ēt)2 (9γ−4(2−β̄)t2 )
9(9γ−2(2−β̄)t2 )

2

2(a−ēt)2 (9γ−4t2 )

2

Table III: Components of Social Welfare
11

This specific function is chosen in order to present the basic point on the difference between the two
modelling approaches as simply as possible.
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As is often the case in this type of analysis, a closed-form solution (for the maximization
of the social welfare equation) cannot be obtained. Nevertheless we have solved this
numerically and have run extensive simulations.12 Below we report representative results.
In the simulations, we chose parameter values that are allowed by the restrictions imposed
by the analysis; these restrictions refer to the E-R&D efficiency parameter γ (specifically
we report here results for γ = 8 to satisfy the second order and stability conditions for
both non-cooperative and cooperative cases in the AJ and KMZ mdoels), the market
size a (which is a scale factor and set at a = 20) and initial marginal emissions, ē. The
latter must be ē ≤ 1. If ē > 1, the optimal tax rate would be set at t = 1 and there
would never be any interaction or offset from the spillover. Hence, to avoid examining
this (trivial) case we focus on ē ≤ 1, where the optimal tax rate is t < 1.

5.1

The Optimal Tax and Emissions

Figures 1,2 and 3 show the relationship between the spillover β and the emission tax t,
while Figure 4 illustrates agreggate emissions for the AJ and KMZ models.
For case N in the AJ model there is a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal
emissions tax rate and the spillover (figure 1a). This is due to the two opposing effects
(direct and strategic) reported in Proposition 1. When β̃ ≥ 0.5 the strategic effect of an
increase in the spillover, creates an incentive for firms to free-ride on abatement effort.
The second effect occurs because as β̃ increases, it also increases the effectiveness of
aggregate abatement. When β̃ < 0.5, as the spillover increases the optimal emissions
12

The results are available from the authors upon request.
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(c): Non cooperative vs Cooperative

Figure 1: Optimal emissions tax - AJ Model (a = 20, e = 0.5, γ = 8)
tax decreases. As emissions are decreasing in β (figure 4a), this implies that emissions
will be lowest when the spillover β = 1. This confirms Proposition 3 and the discussion
following it.
For case N in the KMZ model, the optimal emissions tax is always increasing with β̄
(figure 2a). Recall that is the KMZ model, R&D (input) spillovers embody the positive
knowledge externality created by R&D. There is no (output) spillover associated with
abatement. As a consequence, the strategic free-riding effect associated with knowledge
is dominant in the KMZ model under the non-cooperative R&D regimes. The underlying
reason for this is that in the KMZ model there is an implicit assumption that E-R&D is
17
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(a): Cases N and NJ
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(c): Non cooperative vs Cooperative

Figure 2: Optimal emissions tax - KMZ Model (a = 20, e = 0.5, γ = 8)
always more cost efficient under a single laboratory, regardless of the extent of spillovers.
Hence an increase in the spillover has a negative strategic effect (i.e. acts as a disincentive) on E-R&D, dominating the positive direct effect. The emission tax must increase
to offset this (cf. proposition 5). As in the AJ model, emissions decrease as the spillover
increases and are lowest when β̄ = 1 (figure 4b). However, this occurs because of the
impact of higher emissions taxes, which rise to offset the impact β̄.
For cases C and CJ, there is a clear trade-off between the E-R&D spillover β and the
emission tax t across the AJ and KMZ models (figures 1b and 2b). Specifically, increases
in the spillover translate into a lower optimal emission tax, with t is at its lowest when
18
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t
1.0
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AJ nc
AJ c

0.6

KMZ nc
KMZ c

0.4

Β
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Figure 3: Optimal emissions tax - AJ and KMZ (a = 20, e = 0.5, γ = 8)
β = 1 (i.e., Case CJ). Only the direct effect operates here as there is no strategic effect. It
is also evident (see figures 1c, 2c and 3) that the optimal emission tax under cooperative
R&D is higher than under non-cooperative regimes whenever the spillover is relatively
low (β < 0.5) and vice versa for relatively high spillover (β ≥ 0.5). Note that when
comparing non-cooperative research (Cases N and NJ), with cooperative research (C and
CJ) in the AJ, that emissions reduction is higher under non-cooperative (cooperative)
R&D when R&D spillovers are large (small), i.e. when R&D spillovers are greater (less)
than 0.5 (figure 4c). This indicates that within the AJ model, as an additional policy
instrument, when R&D spillovers are less than 0.5, the pursuit of R&D cooperation leads
to greater reductions in emissions.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Emissions (a = 20, e = 0.5, γ = 8)
5.2

E-R&D - Abatement

Figures 5 and 6 show the relationship between E-R&D (abatement) and the spillover.
The relationship between β and abatement activity is quite different in the two models.
In the AJ model, an increase in β̃ always leads to a decrease in abatement activity,
regardless of whether or not firms decide to cooperate in R&D (figures 5a and 5b). By
comparison, in the KMZ model, an increase in β̄ leads to higher investment in abatement
(figures 5c and 5d). Figure 6 shows that abatement activity is always lower in the AJ
model (except for a zero spillover when the models are equivalent).
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Figure 5: E-R&D (abatement activity) (a = 20, e = 0.5, γ = 8)
This is purely the result of E-R&D having constant returns to scale under the AJ model:
R&D spillovers have greater impact on the productivity of each firm’s abatement effort
leading to a lower emission tax relative to the KMZ model. A lower level of investment
in E-R&D in the AJ model will always deliver relatively higher effective abatement effort
and lower aggregate emissions, when compared to the KMZ model regardless of whether
or not firms cooperate or not in R&D. This points to an important difference between
the KMZ and AJ models, that in the AJ model spillovers occur because of abatement
activity and R&D activity. Therefore emissions taxes and abatement are lower in the AJ
model because emissions reduction occurs as a consequence of each firm’s investment in
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E-R&D and aggregate abatement activity.
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Figure 6: E-R&D - Cooperative vs Non-cooperative (a = 20, e = 0.5, γ = 8)
From the perspective of a policy maker the following two implications can be drawn.
First, governments need not set emission taxes at high levels to achieve reductions in
emissions (pollution control) because of beneficial spillovers emanating from the abatement activities of firms in the economy. Second, the analysis has uncovered a novel
trade-off between an optimal emissions tax and R&D cooperation in reducing pollution.
When R&D spillovers are low (β < 0.5), R&D cooperation (research cartel or RJV)
achieves greater reductions in emissions. By contrast when R&D spillovers are high
(β > 0.5) non-cooperative R&D is more effective in conjunction with higher emissions
taxes. This is a general rule that holds across both modelling specifications of the R&D
spillover process.
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6

Conclusion

This paper performs a comparison of two differing approaches to modelling spillovers
associated with green technology (E-R&D) in a non-tournament R&D model. In summary:
1. There is a marked difference between the two models, in that the KMZ model
(R&D input spillovers) leads to higher emission taxes, higher E-R&D and higher
emissions, relative to the AJ model (R&D output spillovers).
2. There is a counter intuitive positive relationship between R&D input spillovers and
emission taxes in the non-cooperative scenarios in the KMZ model. This reflects
a stylised fact that R&D should be more cost efficient if generated in a single
laboratory. These spillovers lead to an appropriation of E-R&D , which creates a
disincentive for investment in E-R&D . Hence, the emission tax must increase to
promote investment in E-R&D.
3. By contrast, there exists a U-shaped relationship between the optimal emissions
tax rate and the R&D spillover rate in the non-cooperative scenarios in the AJ
model, pointing to a tradeoff between R&D output spillovers and emissions taxes
when spillovers are relatively small (less than 0.5). This trade-off between the
optimal emissions tax and the R&D spillovers also exists for both input and output
spillovers when firms cooperate in R&D.
4. In general the KMZ model requires higher taxes to achieve an equivalent reduction
in emissions to that of the AJ model. This is because of the existence of abatement
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and knowledge spillovers in the AJ model. Hence, the existence of knowledge and
abatement spillovers implies that emissions taxes can be lower than what would be
otherwise required.
Another important observation is the relative effectiveness of combining cooperative
R&D with the emissions tax as a means of reducing pollution. The numerical results
show that (for both the KMZ and AJ models) cooperative R&D is more effective when
R&D spillovers are low (less than 0.5). If R&D spillovers are relatively large (exceed 0.5),
then emissions taxes coupled with competitive R&D become more effective in reducing
pollution. This points to a trade-off for policy makers between R&D polices designed
to promote cooperative R&D and emissions taxes. The results in this paper suggest
that RJVs and similar research sharing agreements will be more effective at reducing
pollution when R&D spillovers are low and that emissions taxes will be more effective
when spillovers are high.
As Amir et al. (2008) indicate the AJ model provides a useful insight: that it is R&D
effort, rather than funds invested in R&D, that spillover from an innovating firm to its
rivals. In models of green technology (E-R&D), which are driven by emissions taxes,
this is an important distinction. It can be argued that it is the impact of R&D on
abatement effort and emission reduction that is of crucial importance in designing environmental policy. For this reason, the AJ model may be more suitable for modelling
green technology.
The next step in this line of research is to ascertain empirically the type of E-R&D
production function that drives environmental innovation. It might be that either mod-
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elling approach is valid and this could depend on the type of product, technology and
industry under investigation or it might be that neither of the modelling approaches is a
good representation of reality. Apart from this mainly empirical data question, further
questions to explore in future research include: (i) the importance of quadratic versus
linear damage costs, (ii) the use of alternative environmental policy instruments, e.g.,
tradable permits or standards and (iii) issues of time consistency.

25

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2014

27

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 922 [2014]

References
Amir, R. (2000) Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 1013 - 1032.
Amir, R., Jin, J.Y. and Troege, M. (2008) On additive spillovers and returns to scale in
R&D. International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, 695 - 703.
Burr, C., Knauff, M. and Stepanova, A. (2013) On the prisoner’s dilemma in R&D with
input spillovers and incentives for R&D cooperation. Mathematical Social Sciences. In
Press.
Chiou, J. and Hu, J. (2001) Environmental research joint Ventures under emission taxes.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 20: 129-146.
d’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A. (1988) Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in
duopoly with spillovers. American Economic Review 78, 1133 - 1137.
Griliches, Z. (1984) R&D, Patents and Productivity. (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Il.)
Griliches, Z. (1992) The search for R&D spillovers. Scandinavian Journal of Economics
94, S29-S47.
Hauenschild, N. (2003) On the role of input and output spillovers when R&D projects
are risky. International Journal of Industrial Organization 21(8), 1065-1089
Hinloopen, J. and Vendekerchhove, J. (2009) Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand
competition: input versus output spillovers. Journal of Economics 98(2), 119-136.
26

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper922

28

McDonald and Poyago-Theotoky: Green Technology and Optimal Emissions Taxation

Jaffe, A.B. (1986) ‘Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from
firm’s patents, profits and market value. American Economic Review 76, 984-1001.
Jaffe, A.B. (1998) Measurement issues. In: L.M. Branscomb and J.H. Keller, eds., Investing in Innovation. (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
Jaffe, A.B., Newell, R. and Stavins. R. (2003) Technological change and the environment.
In: Maler, K-G. & Vincent, J. eds. Handbook of Environmental Economics. (NorthHolland, Amsterdam).
Jung, C. , K. Krutilla and R. Boyd (1996) Incentives for advanced pollution abatement
technology at the industry level: An evaluation of policy alternatives. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30, 95-111
Kamien, M., Muller, E., Zang, I. (1992) Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. American Economic Review 82, 1293-1306.
Kneese, A. and C. Schultze (1975) Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy. (Brookings
Institute, Washington, D.C.)
OECD (2010) Climate policy and technological innovation and transfer: An overview of
trends and recent empirical results, Working Party on Global and Structural Policies,
OECD.
Petrakis, E. and Xepapadeas, A. (2001) To commit or not to commit: Environmental
policy in imperfectly competitive markets. University of Crete Working Paper 0110.

27

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2014

29

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 922 [2014]

Petrakis, E. and Xepapadeas, A. (2003) Location decisions of a polluting firm and the
time consistency of environmental policy. Resource and Energy Economics 25, pp.
197-214.
Petrakis, E. and Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2002) R&D subsidies versus R&D cooperation in
a duopoly with spillovers and pollution. Australian Economic Papers, 41, 37 - 52.
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2007) The organization of R&D and environmental policy”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62(1), 63 - 75.
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2010) Corrigendum to The Organization of R&D and Environmental Policy. [J. Econ. Behav. Org. 62 (2007) 63 75]. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 76, 449.
Scott, J. (1996) Environmental research joint ventures among manufacturers. Review of
Industrial Organization 11, 655-679.
Stepanova, A. and Tesoriere, A. (2011) R&D with spillovers: Monopoly versus nonCooperative and cooperative duopoly. Manchester School 79(1), 125-144.
Suzumura, K. (1992) Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in an oligopoly with
spillovers. American Economic Review 82, 1307-1320.

28

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper922

30

McDonald and Poyago-Theotoky: Green Technology and Optimal Emissions Taxation

Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Proof. The equilibrium output for each firm in the product market stage game is





1
qi =
a − t ē − ri 2 − β̃ + rj 1 − 2β̃
,
3

i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.

Taking first partial derivatives of qi with respect to ri and, qj with respect to ri gives

∂qi
=
∂ri



t 2 − β̃

∂qj
=−
∂ri

0 ≤ β̃ < 1,

> 0,

3



t 1 − 2β̃
R 0,

3

β̃ Q 1/2.

Taking the first partial derivative of qi with respect to β̃,
∂qi
1
= − t(ri − 2rj ) > 0,
3
∂ β̃

i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.

if ri ≤ 2rj , and it will be negative otherwise.
Proof of proposition 2
Proof. The equilibrium output for firm i in the product market stage game is given
by



s
s
√
√
1
y
+
β̄y
y
+
β̄y
i
j 
j
i
qi =
a − t ē − 2
+2 2
,
3
γ
γ

i, j = 1, 2
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Taking first partial derivatives with respect to yi and yj yields:




t
β̄
∂qi
2
 > 0,
= √ q
−q
yi +β̄yj
yj +β̄yi
∂yi
3 2γ
γ

and

0 < β̄ ≤ 1

γ





∂qi
t
1
2β̄ 
= √ − q
+q
R 0,
yj +β̄yi
yi +β̄yj
∂yj
3 2γ
γ

1
β̄ Q
2

s

yi + β̄yj
.
yj + β̄yi

γ

Note that the conclusions are identical to the AJ model, if expenditures are identical for
each firm, so that yi = yj for all firms i, j. Taking the first partial derivative of qi with
respect to β̄,




2yj 
t
∂qi
yi
+q
> (<) 0,
= − √ − q
yj +β̄yi
yi +β̄yj
∂ β̄
3 2γ
γ

i, j = 1, 2,

γ

only if
1
yi
< (>)
yj
2

s

yi + β̄yj
,
yj + β̄yi

0 < β ≤ 1.

Proof of proposition 3
Proof. Differentiating rN =

(2−β̃)(a−ēt)t
9γ−2(2−β̃)(1+β̃)t2

with respect to β̃ and applying the second

order condition gives
∂rN
−2t(a − tē)
=
[9γ − 2(2 − β̃)2 t2 ] < 0,
2
2
∂ β̃
(9γ − 2(2 − β̃)(1 + β̃)t )

0 ≤ β̃ < 1.
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As β̃ → 1, E-R&D decreases monotonically. This implies that rN J ≤ rN for 0 < β̃ ≤ 1.

Proof of proposition 4
Proof. Differentiating rC =

2t(1+β̃)(a−tē)
9γ−2(1+β̃)2 t2

with respect to β̃ and applying the second order

condition,

2t(a − ēt)(9γ + 2(1 + β̃)2 t2 )
> 0,
(9γ − 2(1 + β̃)2 t2 )2

0 ≤ β̃ < 1.

This indicates that as β̃ → 1, investment in E-R&D increases monotonically. This
implies that in equilibrium, rC ≤ rCJ for 0 < β̃ ≤ 1.
Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Differentiating y N =

2t2 (a−tē)2 (2−β̄)2 γ
2

(1+β̄)(9γ−2(2−β̄)t2 )

and assuming that the second order

condition holds,
−2t(a − tē)
[9γ − 2(2 − β̄)2 t2 ] < 0,
2
2
(9γ − 2(2 − β̄)(1 + β)t )

0 ≤ β̄ < 1.

Note that as β̄ increases the costs of abatement decrease.
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